Results
author = "Crawford, Vincent P. "
John Nash and the Analysis of Strategic Behavior.
Author(s) :
Crawford, Vincent P.
Description :
This essay describes one economist’s view of how four extraordinary papers by John Nash, two on non-cooperative game theory [Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 36 (1950b) 48–49; Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286–295] and two on the theory of bargaining [Econometrica 18 (1950a) 15...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
Introduction to Experimental Game Theory.
Author(s) :
Crawford, Vincent P.
Description :
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
Learning Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games.
Author(s) :
Crawford, Vincent P.
Description :
This paper compares the leading theoretical approaches to equilibrium selection, both
traditional and adaptive, in the light of recent experiments by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil
(henceforth "VHBB") in which subjects repeatedly played coordination games, uncertain only
about each other's strategy c...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the Salary Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program.
Author(s) :
Crawford, Vincent P.
Description :
Most graduating medical students in the United States obtain hospital residencies through the National Resident Matching Program (“NRMP”). The NRMP, or “Match” as it is called, is a centralized procedure that begins each year with hospitals defining residency positions, including a fixed specificati...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk.
Author(s) :
Crawford, Vincent P.
Description :
This paper is a survey of experimental evidence on behavior in games with communication, focusing on environments where "talk is cheap" in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications. Also considered are some environ-
ments in which communication was permitted throughout the ...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.
Author(s) :
Crawford, Vincent P.
Description :
Starting from an example of the Allies’ decision to feint at Calais and attack
Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors
or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and
rational players’ responses to it yields a sensible account...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play.
Description :
A model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game, with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group. Subjects bid the market-clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
Level-k Auctions: Can Boundedly Rational Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
Description :
This paper proposes a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to
incomplete-information games based on “level-k” thinking, which describes behavior
in many experiments with complete-information games.We derive the model’s implications
in first- and second-price auctions with general inf...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games.
Description :
“Hide-and-seek” games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic “landscapes” that frame decisions nonneutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined
The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures.
Description :
Since Schelling, it has often been assumed that players make use of salient decision labels to achieve coordination. Consistent with previous work, we find that given equal payoffs, salient labels yield frequent coordination. However, given even minutely asymmetric payoffs, labels lose much of their...
Repository :
Oxford University Research Archive (ORA)
Language(s) :
Undetermined